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COMRADES IN ARMS: THE INFLUENCE OF GEORGE S. PATTON ON WALTON H. WALKER'S PUSAN PERIMETER DEFENSE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DEAN A. NOWOWIEJSKI
United States Army

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Successful senior leadership in the Army is strengthened based on the quality of professional relationships and role models provided between senior and junior officers. Senior leaders were developed by their experiences, and they must set the example for those who follow. This paper explores one example of the effects of modeled leadership on the professional development of an important U.S. strategic leader: General Walton H. Walker as demonstrated during his defense of the Pusan Perimeter in August-September 1950 in Korea. General Walker served as the XX Corps Commander under General George S. Patton’s Third Army for the duration of World War II. There were demonstrable effects of George S. Patton’s influence on Walton Walker coming from this period of senior leader relationship in combat.

This paper develops Patton’s effects on Walker’s leadership style, on his relationships with his staff, and in the formulation of the defensive operational concept, including Walker’s orchestration of counterattacking reserves during the Pusan Perimeter. Walker’s generalship was developed over a lifetime and refined under a period of Patton’s senior leadership. It was not merely the common experience in World War II between Patton and Walker that shaped him, but Patton’s role model that influenced the common tenets of leadership and warfighting demonstrated by Walker at the Pusan Perimeter. The paper concludes with prospects for today based on historical lessons of Walker’s interwar generation of officers.
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I wish to acknowledge the help of several “old soldiers” in completing this strategy research project. I use the term “old soldiers” respectfully and as a term of honor. The writings on the Korean War still pale in comparison of volume to those on World War II. The generation of the Korean War is also reaching maturity, and is worthy of the same honor as those of “The Greatest Generation.” I could not have completed this project, or arrived anywhere near to the historical truth about General Walton H. Walker, without the assistance of a set of Korean War veterans, all of whom consented to be interviewed for this project. They are: General Sam S. Walker, Brigadier Generals Uzal W. Ent, and Edward M. Lynch, and Colonel Layton C. Tyner. Their relationship to the Korean War or to General Walker are made clear in the endnotes and bibliography. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the advice and assistance of my Faculty Adviser from the United States Army War College, Colonel Donald W. Boose, Jr., who shared freely with me out of his own set of writings, references, and recognized expertise on the Korean War. All of these “old soldiers” contributed in an irreplaceable way to the completion of this project, and I wholeheartedly thank them. I also thank my wife of 23 years, Jan S. Nowowiejski, for her constant support in this, and many other, difficult and time-consuming Army projects, deployments, and periods of temporary duty away from home. She is my strongest encourager.
Successful senior leadership in the Army is strengthened based on the quality of professional relationships and role models provided between senior and junior officers. Senior leaders were developed by their experiences, and they must set the example for those who follow. The power of those ties is often challenged today by rapid pace and constant rotation of assignments. Additionally, the cultural ethic in the U.S. military of rugged individualism and personal responsibility, “make it on your own canteen,” works to deny the personal relationships upon which close professional associations are based. Despite all the emphasis on the subject today, there are few professional mentors. Further, for those who need to know how to exercise effective leadership in the crucible of combat, there are few on active duty today with extensive experience. We must look to an earlier era. This paper will explore one example of the effects of modeled leadership on the professional development of an important U.S. strategic leader: General Walton H. Walker as demonstrated during his defense of the Pusan Perimeter in August-September 1950 in Korea. General Walker served as the XX Corps Commander under General George S. Patton’s Third Army for the duration of World War II. There were demonstrable effects of George S. Patton’s influence on Walton Walker coming from this period of senior leader relationship in combat. This paper will show Patton’s effects on Walker’s leadership style, on his relationships with his staff, and in the formulation of the operational concept of the Pusan Perimeter defense. It is based on primary source interviews with General Walker’s son and personal staff during the Korean War, and on intensive secondary source research into the conduct of the Pusan Perimeter defense, Patton as a professional role model, the relationship between Patton and Walker during World War II, and the effects of that relationship during the Korean War. The paper concludes with prospects for today.

**WALKER’S UNRECOGNIZED SUCCESS**

General Walton H. Walker conducted one of the most brilliant campaigns in American military history during the Eighth Army’s defense of the Pusan Perimeter against North Korean attack during August-September 1950, but his success was not fully recognized at the time, nor has it ever been fully recognized in historical circles. The defense of the Pusan Perimeter is
often overshadowed by General Douglas MacArthur's invasion of Inchon, Walker's later retreat in the face of the communist Chinese, and his untimely death before they were defeated. The reasons that Walker's defense deserves unusual merit is because it was the turning point from defeat toward victory, conducted with untrained and demoralized troops, inexperienced commanders, no subordinate Corps headquarters, with demonstrated acumen in employing reserves at just the right time and place, and with no recourse if Walker were to misjudge. His personal leadership during this period contributed directly to victory, as Walker was constantly at the front, taking great personal risk to assess the situation firsthand, and being present to motivate querulous commanders and front line troops alike.¹

Walton Walker executed a form of defense during the Pusan Perimeter that was ahead of its time in the doctrinal sense, but has come to be standard doctrine since then—that of the mobile defense. This form of defense only existed in armored force doctrine in 1950, but was thereafter adopted as part of the standard operations manual for the Army, the 1954 Field Manual 100-5.² The Pusan Perimeter enclosed a large area. The Naktong River bound it on the west for 80 of its 90 miles; the northern boundary was a mountainous defense line of 60 miles.³ Walker basically outposted the Pusan perimeter, because its large size and the limited troops available to him prevented Walker from establishing the doctrinal norm—an area defense. Instead, Walker made use of the mobility of American forces and the interior road and rail lines that caused him to choose the Perimeter in the first place. He would employ forces along the major routes of advance into the perimeter, rely on air and artillery firepower, and reposition reserves where the line was threatened. Walker's mastery of the mobile defense lay not only in his employment of an appropriate defensive concept, but also most importantly in his impeccable timing. On multiple occasions, the Pusan Perimeter was simultaneously threatened along several different approaches, and General Walker sent his scant reserves to just the right place at the right time. An incredible sense of operational timing set Walker apart.⁴

What makes Walton Walker's achievements in the successful Pusan Perimeter defense even more remarkable is that they came at a time when United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces had experienced an almost unbroken string of losses against the North Koreans. Walker defended with forces that were untrained, unready, already exhausted from a month of combat, with poor division and regimental leadership. He received less battalions than he had originally believed he would have to defend with, and had no choice but to feed those battalions one at a time against the onslaught of the North Koreans wherever they were needed most. Additionally, General Walker was faced with the dilemma of anchoring his northern mountainous flank with coalition forces that he had come to distrust as unreliable as well. In several cases
General Walker sent U.S. units to backstop ROK units in case their defense gave way. Neither U.S. or ROK forces, nor their leaders, were dependable at the time of the Pusan Perimeter, so Walton Walker always had the dilemma of gauging whether a committed force that should have been enough to shore up his mobile defense would instead fail in its mission and need additional reinforcement. This fact makes his correct calls in commitment all the more fascinating.5

General Walker trained division commanders while conducting the battle. Only Major General William Dean, the Division Commander of the 24th Infantry Division, had World War II combat leadership experience. Walker’s other division commanders had served as staff officers in the war that had ended five years earlier. This was their first introduction to combat, and they didn’t know how to lead their divisions. General Walker exercised a pervasive presence during August and September 1950, frequently visiting the front line and then these division commanders, while bolstering their flagging morale. Walker coached, warned and explained; practicing an engaged leadership that fulfilled the ethic of issuing only directives he believed could be executed.6 General Walker, the Army commander, fought the entire Pusan Perimeter battle without the benefit of subordinate corps commanders. Though this essentially cast him in the familiar role of being a corps commander himself, it stretched Walker to have to serve so many untrained subordinates without additional support. Nevertheless, in most cases he knew even more about their battles than they did.7 Walton Walker’s personal leadership of his own division commanders was one of the challenges and success stories of the defense.

Clay Blair recently stated that General Walker had the advantage of prior knowledge of North Korean attacks because of remarkably successful programs of communications intelligence (COMINT) within Eighth Army.8 If true, he did have a significant advantage in deciding where to position his reserves. This was not perfect knowledge, however, and Walker relied on a system of commander’s essential elements of information (EEI) in order to focus his subordinate commanders and his own staff on what he needed to know.9 The combination of COMINT and EEI means that Walker anticipated modern commander practice of information warfare. He sought an advantage over his opponent in information, and focused his staff and assets on achieving that advantage. Walker had superior knowledge of his battlespace, and this is one of the reasons he could successfully defend against simultaneous attacks along several routes of advance into his large position.

The official historian of the Korean War, Roy Appleman, stated that to understand the Pusan Perimeter defense, a reader must realize that General Walker had repeated, simultaneous threats along the major axes into the perimeter that challenged his decision-
making. Contrary to historical description, which must deal with one story at a time, Walker was confronted in mid-August and early September with two different crises that involved simultaneous enemy attacks. From southwest to northeast, the North Koreans took 4 different approaches to break through to the port of Pusan. They were: the approach from near the mouth of the Nakto River toward Masan, the Nakto Bulge, the multiple approaches to Taegu near the northwest corner of the Perimeter, and the coastal approach through Pohang through the Taebaek mountains and ROK defense lines. On these two separate occasions, the North Koreans threatened to break through the Perimeter at these four points nearly simultaneously. Walker’s success was judicious use of scarce reserves at the most critical of these threatened points, just in time to prevent penetration of his defense, and to do it over and over again.

Walton Walker used ingenious means to develop his battlespace awareness during the Pusan Perimeter defense. He built and kept superior awareness of both friendly and enemy dispositions. Specifically, Walker used his Chief of Staff, Colonel Eugene M. Landrum, his assistant Operations Officer, Colonel Allen D. MacLean, and his personal staff, Aide Major Layton C. (Joe) Tyner and Pilot Captain Edward M. (Mike) Lynch, as “directed telescopes” to help him ferret out the truth of the situation across Eighth Army. First of all, Walker himself was present at the forward command posts to an exceptional degree. While visiting, his personal staff received the mission from Walker of talking to staff sections to discover true conditions and morale, and to provide General Walker with those assessments when they had departed. Colonel MacLean worked an independent course, often with guidance from the commanding general, that took him to alternate locations where his personal leadership was felt while MacLean gathered information. Finally, this information gathering team was capped by the Eighth Army Chief of Staff, himself a very experienced warfighter with a close relationship to the commanding general. Throughout the Pusan Perimeter defense, it was Eugene Landrum’s primary job to keep status of units in order to scare up additional reserves for General Walker to employ. This was a challenge, requiring not only knowledge of committed units and logistics, but also a degree of anticipation on Landrum’s part as to projected unit potential locations and strength. The combination of his own assessments with those of these trusted agents gave Walker a hard-won superior knowledge of his battlespace.

Part of the reason that General Walker is only beginning to be recognized for his mastery of tactics during August-September 1950 is that his own boss, General Douglas MacArthur, stood aloof from Walker. Instead of remaining in touch with his fighting commander, MacArthur imposed a subordinate to Walker in rank, the Far East Command Chief of Staff,
Major General Edward Almond, as the official filter of information coming from Walker in Korea. It is common knowledge today that MacArthur suppressed the exploits of subordinate commanders throughout the war in the Pacific in World War II, notable among them Robert Eichelberger at Buna. This tendency to aggrandize glory for himself was even more exacerbated in Korea. MacArthur only made infrequent visits to the front, usually in the face of a crisis or an impending major offensive. His knowledge of details was totally dependent on what his Chief of Staff told him. The poor flow of filtered information between Walker and MacArthur and the General Headquarters staff in Tokyo meant that Walker didn't get credit for what he did that was not easily understood, and that MacArthur would take credit for success wherever it clearly existed. A principal culprit in this was Chief of Staff Almond.

Edward Almond was four years junior to General Walker in service, having entered the Virginia Military Institute the summer that Walker graduated from West Point. In 1950 he was a Major General with little combat experience compared to Lieutenant General Walker's command in combat for the duration of the European campaign. There was open hostility between Walker and Almond, a fact that is reported in several historical sources. Almond disliked Walker and wanted his job. This hostility was exacerbated by Almond's limited understanding of the true state of affairs in Korea, yet his control over the flow of information to the Commander in Chief of the theater. A prime example of this was Almond's reporting to MacArthur in late July that Walker was withdrawing the Eighth Army Headquarters to Pusan, when in fact Walker had only asked to withdraw the one-of-a-kind in theater radio-teletype equipment over the congested roads toward Pusan in order to protect it from potential destruction. Walker had no intent of retreat, and was beginning to stabilize the situation. Instead, he received an immediate visit from the CINC on 27 July because of an incorrect report to the CINC from the FEC Chief of Staff. It is a wonder that General Walker put up with this intolerable situation. Known for his loyalty to superiors, and his soldier discipline, Walker quietly endured the injustices of misunderstanding perpetuated on him by Edward Almond. The independence of the X Corps from Eighth Army control at Inchon, with Almond in command while retaining his job at FEC, followed by the debacle of the Chosin Reservoir for the independent X Corps, were further consequences of the refusal of Almond to be subordinate to Walker. This situation fostered by CINCFE had disastrous effects on the conduct of the war in Korea. Walker's extreme loyalty to superiors prevented him from challenging these command and control anomalies, and in turn, prevented the GHQ staff from ever coming to a full understanding of the great significance of Walker's operational successes.
It was Walker’s superior leadership at the front that made the Pusan Perimeter the success it was. Walker knew exactly what conditions were in the battle. Though not physically imposing, or the picture of a general officer, Walton Walker possessed dogged determination that publicly earned him the nickname, “Bulldog.” When his division commanders wavered, Walker refused to give in. He spoke on several occasions to division staffs about their situation on the Perimeter, and how there would be no withdrawal by sea, in what became known in journalistic circles as the “Stand or Die” order. He exhibited personal fearlessness in the face of danger, and moral courage in the most challenging of circumstances. General Walton Walker only recently is beginning to receive his full due of respect for his accomplishment.

THE COMMONLY RECOGNIZED SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PATTON AND WALKER

Many authors have written about how Walton Walker admired and emulated George Patton, but when you dig into specifics, they are scant about the ways that Walker was like Patton. Sometimes the comparison between Walker, with his rotund figure and scowling face, and Patton, the tall white-haired image of warrior, borders on the comical. Patton himself seems to have had the most trouble identifying with his subordinate of World War II years because of Walker’s short frame and struggles with weight. It seems that Patton had trouble picturing a fat warrior. He gradually swung his opinion to the entirely positive side over time, as we will see. At the minimum, the popular comparisons of Walker and Patton stem from their methods of leading from the front, and the known use of Patton references by Walker during the Korean War.

Walker has been written as a Patton disciple in many sources. That he emulated Patton and idolized him seems to be widely accepted. It was commonly known that the two generals had served together in World War II, and that Walker made extraordinary efforts to attend Patton’s funeral in Europe after his untimely death. Walker flew to Europe from Texas, and took a light plane to the funeral site, only to be prevented from landing by dense fog. The best he could do was to orbit the location and see Mrs. Patton later in the day. This certainly speaks of devotion, but in what way? A Time magazine article published during the time of the Pusan Perimeter battles contains several references to Walker as a Patton disciple, and cites Patton as saying that he felt, “Walker had satisfactorily absorbed his (Patton’s) own battle
philosophy. In what way absorbed, one wonders? It is these specifics that we seek to expose.

Both Walker and Patton spent their time in vehicles or aircraft visiting the front lines. The images of Patton in his M8 Scout Car were made common by the movie, Patton. Walton Walker was most notorious for his adherence to the Patton maxim that a minute wasted could cost a battle, as Walker became a speed demon on the primitive roads of Korea. His Aide, Major Tyner, equipped two jeeps with wire cutters, machineguns, star plates, and mine plates and in these vehicles Walker visited the front every single day, except when prevented by VIP visits. Like Patton, he had a siren and flashing red light mounted on these vehicles. Colonel (Retired) Tyner remembers that there was a North Korean air horn in Walker's entourage, because it was needed for Walker to pass the many 2½ ton trucks on the roads without a muffler. This forms an interesting comparison to Patton's use of a steamboat siren on his car while in the early days of training for World War II with the 2d Armored Division. Walker's pilot, Mike Lynch, remembers that Patton took airplanes back from the front after driving forward, in order to contribute to the myth that he had never departed the front lines. The composite of this comparison is that both generals frequented the front lines in similar public fashion, and both used light airplanes as an adjunct for these visits and for personal reconnaissance. This common behavior is one of the verifiable specifics of what Walker and Patton held in common.

There is also little dispute that Walton Walker had references from Patton close by during Walker's conduct of the Pusan Perimeter defense. Which ones, and in what locations they were kept, is a matter of historical dispute. The first reference was Patton's posthumously published volume, War As I Knew It, which Walker is said to have kept by his bedside. It is this reference that offers the greatest potential to explore specific ideas that may have influenced Walker. Second, there is agreement that Walker had a second source at his desk in Eighth Army headquarters, but just exactly what it was is in some doubt. Joe Tyner recalls the document as Patton's own ideas on combat, while Toland cites it as a volume of Third Army Lessons Learned. Since Patton himself encouraged the study of Third Army Lessons learned, and since the XX Corps history had just then recently been published in Japan, the most plausible explanation of this document is that it was probably a version of Army or Corps lessons learned in combat. The agreed fact is that there were references associated with Patton that General Walker kept close at hand during the battles in Korea.

In sum, the specifics of how Walker emulated Patton during the Korean War are short. Many wrote of how he admired and emulated Patton. He copied his methods of speeding
around the front in ground or air transport. He kept ready references associated with his professional relationship with Patton from five years earlier. But just how Patton impacted Walker remains vague.

**PATTON THE SERIOUS STUDENT AND COMBAT LEADER**

Both Carlo D'Este and Roger H. Nye have written about the seriousness of George S. Patton's lifetime of intense study of the military profession and its impact on his personal development, culminating in the Second World War. Patton envisioned for himself a place of greatness in history, and set about consciously to achieve it through intensive scholarship. He wrote a long series of professional articles, concentrated during the interwar years, and often gave lectures or classes to his subordinates. His many notes and marginal notations were sufficient to form the basis of Nye's book, *The Patton Mind*. What makes this even more remarkable is that Patton suffered from the learning disability of dyslexia, so this extraordinary result stemmed from superhuman effort.

The key pole star in Patton's professional development was his strong belief in the critical importance of leadership to success in battle. From this belief in the centrality of leadership came Patton's emphasis on fearless officer presence at the battlefront with the fighting man, and his leadership philosophy about the importance of caring for the soldier. These in turn caused Patton to pay more attention to soldier welfare than other generals, to minimize casualties, and convinced Patton of the need to visit wounded soldiers in hospitals.\(^{30}\) Nothing was as important about a general to Patton than his leadership ability, and this appears to have been a lifetime belief.\(^{31}\) We will see from Walton Walker's behavior and statements that he also believed in the primacy of leadership.

Because of his belief in leadership, Patton fostered an unusual relationship with his staff. The Third Army staff was known during World War II as a staff greater than the sum of its individual parts. His staff accomplished remarkable feats, such as its 90-degree redirection in the dead of winter to relieve Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge.\(^{32}\) There were no standout heroes in the staff, but a group ready to take on any challenge and efficiently produce a product. Patton emphasized a sense of belonging, of pride and standards, and most of all an atmosphere of efficiency and calm in crisis that permeated the Third Army Headquarters, and allowed the staff to exceed the sum of its individual parts.\(^{33}\) Contrary to his cultivated public
image, Patton did not curse around this military family he had fostered, and instead emphasized a sense of belonging. His staff remained remarkably stable over the course of the war, with the primaries remaining in place from prewar mobilization to end. 34 Patton inspired a great sense of unity, and trained his staff to think ahead with him. He always worked 3 battles, the current one and two deep, and his staff was trained to anticipate his questions. Patton emphasized the importance of terrain analysis and intelligence in seeking an information advantage over his opponents. 35 He developed a capable staff whose teamwork and common identification with his priorities gave the Third Army an advantage in operations.

Patton was a master at using the staff to gather information. He held twice daily battle updates with his own staff, created an Army Information Service out-of-hide using the 6th Cavalry Group, used a large and effective liaison pool, and generated battle maps each day showing key crossroads affecting the battle. He clearly sought an information advantage. His use of the 6th Cavalry Group to create an Army Information Service is a telling example of the importance that Patton attached to information. This was basically a large group of “directed telescope” liaison officers whose purpose was to gather battlefield information under Patton’s commander priorities. In addition to this, Patton fostered a large set of liaison officers for his Army headquarters, who were full partners in the staff updates mentioned above. 36 The effect of gaining this information was to allow Patton to use his preferred operational technique of “grabbing the enemy in the nose and kicking him in the pants” namely, to find a point of resistance using superior information, engage it, and then use a mobile force to exploit to the depths of the enemy formation. 37 Thus Patton combined the use of information and doctrine for mobile warfare with a highly refined staff operation to fulfill his vision for leadership and achieve the goals for which he had spent years of professional development.

(Patton’s) affection for Walker was born of empathy for someone he was fond of referring to as a “fight(er)”
—Carlo D’Este
Walker is a very fine soldier.
—George S. Patton

PATTON’S COMBAT LEADERSHIP AND WALTON WALKER

The relationship between Walton H. Walker and George S. Patton grew out of common experience in World War II. They both gained fame at the Desert Training Center for armored forces east of Indio, California in 1942, where Walker took Patton's place in command. It was here that Walker first commanded the IV Armored Corps that later became the XX Corps in the Third Army. XX Corps fought under General Patton’s leadership for the duration of ground
combat in the European theater from its entry into battle following Normandy until halted near Linz, Austria, the farthest east of any of Patton's Corps. It can be argued that Walker became the favorite of Patton's corps commanders, not only because of the stability of their command relationship, but because Walker habitually obeyed orders without complaint, and because Walker understood and executed Patton's method of mobile armored warfare. By the end of the war, Walker had become such an expert at the type of slashing, mobile armored exploitation that Patton desired that he considered tailoring the XX Corps to be the war's first all armored division corps. This relationship born of combat must have had an impact on both men, as relationships born of trial usually do. To explore the meaning of that relationship is the purpose of this section.

There are multiple references that lead the researcher to believe that Patton may not have taken Walker seriously, or initially even expected much from him. This seems to be the result of an inherent distrust Patton held for fat men, and he perceived Walker as fat, though in fact General Walker simply had a barrel chest and short stature. Patton referred to Walker as, "fat Walker," and is quoted as saying, "He'll do well unless he blows up." Patton had a hard time taking Walker seriously for this reason. This initial disdain gradually grew to respect and confidence as Walker proved himself in operation after operation to be a fighting man in the Patton mold. In the end, Walker was one of Patton's favorites.

This mutual admiration grew out of Walker's obedience to instructions and loyalty to Patton, and Patton's realization that Walker understood and would execute his intent. Walker confided to Patton that the Third Army corps commanders had achieved success because Patton had allowed them to command at their own initiative, and they had the freedom to make mistakes. In turn, Patton realized that Walker was loyal, not complaining, even with unpopular decisions. Further, both men ascribed to the central tenet of Patton's belief: Attack! Patton used Walker's corps to initiate his drives to the Rhine. Walker's corps was the envisioned spearhead to get through the West Wall and then into Germany in exploitation mode before its defenses could be constituted. This ended when Patton's army ran out of gas. Patton planned to use the XX Corps to resume his army's offensive after the Battle of the Bulge was over, and in fact used incremental attacks from the Saarlautern bridgehead by the XX Corps to get going to the Rhine. Walker's XX Corps became the device that Patton used to fulfill his philosophy and intent of attack, and Walker's Corps initiated Patton's most cherished offensive, that to the heart of Germany.

The XX Corps achieved several notable successes in its operations under Walker as part of Patton's Third Army. It first captured Chartres during the Third Army exploitation on 16
August, prompting a visit from Patton to Walker at the intact bridge in the center of town.\textsuperscript{45} Walker was poised for an early advance through the West Wall when his offensive ground to a 5-day halt for want of fuel.\textsuperscript{46} This time allowed the Germans to reconstitute their defenses, and the bloody campaign for Metz ensued. After several delays and miscalculations, Walker awarded Patton the capture of Metz, with all of its personal historical significance for Patton as an ancient prize, on 21 November 1944.\textsuperscript{47} When the Battle of the Bulge ensued, Patton used Walker’s corps as the jumping off point for his future offensive, retaining their defensive sector both for rest and refit, and as a gateway into the Palatinate.\textsuperscript{48} After resuming the offensive, the capture of Trier was a second historical prize that Walker presented Patton. Patton in his imagination could “smell the sweat of the Roman legions” entering Trier.\textsuperscript{49} Because of his offensive success, Patton gave XX Corps the use of the 12\textsuperscript{th} Armored Division when he received it unexpectedly, and Walker used the extra force to drive to the Rhine at Worms.\textsuperscript{50} As mentioned above, Walker’s corps was the furthest east of any of Patton’s formations at the war’s end. Walker had handed Patton success after historical success during World War II.

These operational successes worked hand in hand with personal favor that Walker earned with Patton. As mentioned, Patton came to admire Walker’s professionalism greatly. Patton recognized Walker’s soldierly and fighting attributes, and paid him a high complement when he publicly praised him by calling him a “fighting son of a bitch.”\textsuperscript{51} Patton recognized Walker as possessing the unique sense of timing that is so highly valued in warriors of armored warfare, that timing required to commit forces on the battlefield at the right place and right time because of astuteness with terrain, time and distance. This was also high praise.\textsuperscript{52} Walker proved to be a learning and adaptive commander. When his freewheeling advance of August ended out of gas in front of Metz, Walker eventually had his staff develop a detailed enemy assessment that included every building in Metz suspected of housing Germans. Walker did what was required to advance.\textsuperscript{53} The personal relationship that he built with Patton was strong enough for Patton to use the same set of lieutenant general’s stars that had been presented to him by Eisenhower to promote Walker to Lieutenant General when it came his turn. As Army officers know, this use of rank insignia from one officer to a junior officer being promoted is a sign of comradeship and affection.\textsuperscript{54} Patton also awarded the nation’s second highest award for valor to Walker for actions in combat in leading Combat Command R of the 7\textsuperscript{th} Armored Division to cross the Seine River at Melun on 23 August 1944. This award of the Distinguished Service Cross was for the same type of “take charge at the front and lead by example under fire” behavior that Patton valued so highly.\textsuperscript{55} So Walker enjoyed operational success and personal favor from Patton.
EXPERIENCES IN EUROPE THAT SHAPED WALKER FOR KOREA

Some of the experiences that Walker shared with Patton during World War II would offer lessons to shape Walker's conduct of the Korean War. Walker's conduct of defensive operations at the Pusan Perimeter had two principal precursors during World War II. The first was in September 1944 after the XX Corps' dash east had ended, and Walker was struggling to get past Metz, now heavily defended. On 10 September Walker's corps was holding a front of 40 kilometers with 2 divisions. This stretch already exceeded the designed frontage for 2 infantry divisions. In an effort to get his Corps across the Moselle, Walker shifted his Corps to the right and used the 43d Reconnaissance Squadron to portray a defense and thus attempt to deceive the enemy in the north. This was to obtain enough combat power to resume the offensive. Walker thinned the line and attacked.56

The second occasion of defense for the XX Corps was their famed assumption of the Third Army line, with assistance from Dever's Sixth Army Group from the south, as Patton turned the remainder of the Third Army ninety degrees to the north and went to the relief of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. General Walker consolidated his force west of the Saar, leaving one bridgehead open for future offensive operations, and assumed aggressive reconnaissance and patrolling. This fitted General Patton's intent to use the XX Corps zone as a rest and refit area and the launching point for future operations across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany. General Patton had enough confidence in General Walker to give him this critical mission, and Walker proved the tactical acumen required to preserve a thinly held line with a defensive screen of infantry and cavalry. This foothold across the Saar would later prove just what Patton and Walker envisioned for it, a place to resume the attack.57 This time period is commonly known to have been Walker's principal experience on the defensive in World War II, and he effectively used patrols, reconnaissance, and screening forces to complete the mission, ready to resume the offensive. There are similarities between these World War II defensive situations and those of Walker later in Korea, particularly in the thinness of the defense and requirements for mobility.

General Walker learned lessons from World War II that were openly applicable during the Korean War. From the disastrous halt in late August 1944, Walker learned the importance of logistics to sustaining an offensive. He showed great concern during the Pusan Perimeter battle with the retention of the road and rail network inside the perimeter itself to use for logistic resupply and rapid repositioning of reserves. Walker learned the cost of attacking fortified, urban defenses at Metz. During the Korean War, he sought to bypass Seoul so as not to
engage the defending enemy there.\textsuperscript{58} What Walker felt was more useful was the destruction of the retreating North Korean force, rather than being tied to the capital city. The use of a bridgehead across the Saar as an offensive jumping off point, just like Walker's lateral repositioning of the XX Corps to cross the Moselle, taught Walker the importance of posturing for the resumption of the offensive. He kept the prospects of resuming the offensive in mind throughout his defense of the Pusan Perimeter.\textsuperscript{59} These were discrete lessons of experience from the operations of the XX Corps.

Walker and others made comparisons between battles, one war to the next. As mentioned, Walker made the mental comparison of Seoul to Metz. He also compared his plan to trap the North Koreans with a landing at Kunsan rather than MacArthur's target at Inchon with the Battle of the Falaise Gap. His sense of the pending failure of MacArthur's amphibious assault thus confronted both issues, the need to catch the enemy army in a close noose and destroy it, as the Allies had failed to do at Falaise, and the need to avoid entrapment in a city. J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army during Korea, who was Walker's friend and to whom he confided his concept for the Kunsan landing, also made comparison of the defense of the Pusan Perimeter to the success of the Allies at the Battle of the Bulge. Collins had earlier compared the refugees he had seen leaving Taegu to those Belgians he had observed fleeing the Ardennes offensive. The point here is not so much that the comparisons these officers themselves made were correct or telling, but that they made them in the first place. In Korea, the recent memory of combat in World War II had shaped Walton Walker's experience and influenced his actions.\textsuperscript{60}

This is the first time in my 43 years of military experience that I have had to do anything else but attack.
—Walton S. Walker, \textit{Time}, 31 Jul 50

Daily counterattacks will be made by all units. Counterattack is the decisive element of the defense.
—Walton S. Walker, 2 Aug 50

\textbf{PATTON'S ROLE MODEL REFLECTED DURING THE PUSAN PERIMETER DEFENSE}

As elaborated earlier, much has been written to compare Walker to Patton and to suggest that Walton Walker emulated George Patton to a great degree. The specific evidence for a mentoring relationship or acknowledgement by Walker of Patton's influence is lacking.\textsuperscript{61} No one has made an earlier analysis of how Walker's World War II experience may have colored his fighting in Korea, or the specifics of Patton's influence. Rather than prove a relationship of mentorship, this paper will demonstrate how two warriors shared views in
common, and how the older and senior officer may have provided a role model for the junior one, created out of mutual respect and professional relationship. The expertise of both officers, their warfighting ability and leadership philosophy, were derived from both common and shared experience, and the study of history. Walton reflected this comradeship in arms during the Pusan Perimeter defense principally in his leadership techniques, use of his staff, and defensive concepts. These all showed the mark of Patton's professional example.

The most common characteristic shared between Walker and Patton was their manner of combat leadership. They both ascribed to leadership as the fundamental virtue, and believed that the role of the general officer was to take risk at the front inspiring the troops. Their common use of vehicles and light airplanes, probably the principal reason that contemporaries said General Walker emulated General Patton, has already been probed. But more than presence, Walker and Patton shared a view of the significance and character of the leader, of his need to take risk, to insure the welfare of the troops, to be seen by them in danger, to know conditions at the front first hand, and to visit the wounded.62 This element of taking risk extended beyond personal risk to taking calculated risks in operations in order to achieve a larger goal. Patton was a known risk taker in the offense, often pushing his troops hard and extending his lines of communications and exposed flanks. Walker risked a great deal to conduct counterattacks during the Pusan Perimeter defense, often in less than ideal conditions, in order to offset the North Korean objectives and timetable.63

The force of individual character mattered to both. Patton believed that a sense of resolution was an important characteristic in the general officer, that he must impart his will-to-win to his Army. In fact, this emphasis on the warrior spirit and importance of victory colored everything Patton studied to be.64 Walker displayed these qualities most strongly during the Perimeter defense. It is widely recognized that Walker's determination not to give in to the force of the enemy, to stand and hold the line, was the principal reason the defense held under multiple onslaughts over six weeks. He clearly imparted his strength of character, his determination to the Eighth Army.65 They also shared a common sense of the importance of individual responsibility, and this expectation itself is what caused Walker so much misery during the early days of the Korean War, because his subordinates generally did not fulfill his expectation for individual responsibility, either in proficiency or example. The one notable exception may have been MG William Dean, captured after personal heroism earning him the Medal of Honor at Taejon.66

This critical element of strength of will may have showed up in both leaders in a form of split personality. Martin Blumenson has addressed at length the two sides of Patton, the warrior
and the scholar, and the tortured way in which Patton cultivated his public warrior image to the
detriment of showing his softer, emotional side. Carlo D’Este validates this perception. What
many scholars do not reveal is that Walton Walker had two sides to his character as well. He
was known to be reserved in his dealings with the press. He did not inspire outward loyalty
among his soldiers. But he was friendly, a gentleman and considerate social host, and
engaging in person. He counted among his good friends Leonard Gerow, George C. Marshall,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Courtney Hodges. Walker was an intellectual like Patton, who also
made it his lifelong project to study military history.\textsuperscript{67} One historian speculated that Walker’s
outward bluff and bravado, his daredevil driving, martinet-like behavior and perennial frown
were part of a warrior face.\textsuperscript{68} Another noted one side of Walker to be authoritarian, the other a
reflective scholar.\textsuperscript{69} If so, perhaps both Walker and Patton compensated for the softer side of
their personages by an outward gruffness that amounted to fulfillment of the personal
expectation of a warrior character.

Besides these personal characteristics, Walker and Patton had common ways of dealing
with subordinates. They both employed “directed telescopes.” Patton used liaison officers of
the Army Information Service and a staff directed to visit the front daily. Walker used his Chief
of Staff, personal staff, and Deputy G3 to gather information during the Pusan Perimeter battle.
All were vested with the charge and authority to discover real battlefield conditions for the
commanding general.\textsuperscript{70} Both generals empowered their Chiefs of Staff with the authority of their
decision, and relied on them greatly. Neither spent the majority of time at headquarters. They
stayed forward, sensing the battle, and came into the headquarters for prearranged updates.
Patton did twice daily, Walker in the evening. Walker depended on COL Landrum for status of
units and availability of reserves.\textsuperscript{71} Both believed in the use of trusted subordinates, and both
were willing to listen to their opinions and trust their judgment.

Both used these trusted agents to gather powerful information and to posture for the
next day’s battle. Walker and Patton were both masters of time-distance and assiduous
students of enemy situation and effects of terrain. Patton’s war room was a known wonder of
the European theater with its battle maps. George Patton carried a specially prepared map
each day showing crossroads. Walton Walker had the EUSAK staff prepare him special terrain
maps showing roads, railroads, and maneuver corridors critical to his defense of the Pusan
perimeter. He used a specially prepared battle map to attempt to persuade Chief of Staff
Collins that Kunsan was a better amphibious objective than Inchon. There was a common
belief in the power of information, specifically enemy and terrain, and the need for extensive
reconnaissance to obtain it.\textsuperscript{72}
Besides his manner of leadership and use of staff, Walker conducted the Pusan Perimeter defense as a mobile defense, an offensive defense, in a pattern familiar to George S. Patton. As mentioned above, there were two principal times when Walker defended with XX Corps in World War II, the first when brought to a halt by fuel shortages in Third Army at the end of August 1944, and the second while defending the Army front during the Battle of the Bulge. During this first defense, Patton issued a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to his Corps Commanders, classified Secret and not releasable below general officer rank, dated 25 September 1944 and reprinted in Appendix D of *War As I Knew It*. You will recall that General Walker had a review copy of this book at his bedside during the Korean War. There are noticeable parallels between the principles outlined in Patton's Sep 44 LOI, and a similar LOI issued by General Walker for the conduct of the Pusan Perimeter defense.\(^73\) Both outlined the key principle that the defense was to be used as a transition state to the counteroffensive, that nothing was more important than resumption of the attack. Further, the defense was to be characterized by constant local counterattacks.\(^74\) Further, both outlined a defense oriented on principal avenues of approach with mobile reserves in place to counterattack. Patton said:

> We will...utilize a thin outpost zone backed at suitable places by powerful mobile reserves. We will further insure that all possible avenues of tank attacks are registered in by all batteries—Division, Corps, and Armies—whose guns can bear. (The Air Force will) coordinate the concentration of planes in the most expeditious manner. Counterattacks by our mobile reserves should be planned and executed to secure a double envelopment of the hostile effort with the purpose of not only defeating it but destroying it.\(^75\)

This outline is a basic description of the principles under which Walton Walker in August-September 1950 conducted the Pusan Perimeter defense. Walker used an outpost line along the perimeter because he had insufficient force to conduct an area defense. He positioned this defense to orient along the four principal avenues into the Perimeter (as discussed earlier). Instead of tank avenues, Walker oriented artillery and air fires on the possible crossing sites of the Naktong River or known avenues in the mountains to the north. The key to the success of his defense lay in Walker's ingenious use of mobile reserves, and the provision for their use was a key similarity between Patton's instruction for his halted Army and Walker's guidance for the Pusan defense.

Pointing to the similarity between instructions is to suggest that Walker conducted his mobile defense according to patterns that he knew, since the only place where such a defense was even described in 1950 was in the 1949 manual for armored divisions and combat...
commands. He had seen these patterns before during his service under Patton, and had learned and shared them in common as a proponent of mobile warfare and the offensive mindset in the Patton model. Walker and Patton both believed that the only way to win was by attack, and that the defense was merely pretext for eventual counteroffensive. That is exactly the way in which Walker organized his Pusan Perimeter defense in his own LOI to commanders.

This common operational method may have been rooted not only in common experience in the European campaigns of 1944-45, but also in a common study of military history. Patton’s study of history has been well documented and discussed. Few references are made to Walker’s similar study of military history. Nevertheless, closer examination reveals that Walker was also a lifetime student of military history and a collector of books, just like Patton. He visited battlefields and studied the great captains. This habit of professional self-education had a similar impact on Walker as it did Patton, readying both for their roles in conflict.

Further, it may be argued that only a commanding general with the mindset of Walton Walker could have conducted the Pusan Perimeter defense during the late summer of 1950. The Army would have no official doctrine of mobile defense until 1954, and Walker did not have the quality or quantity of troops to constitute a doctrinal area defense. Based on his experiences in World War II in defending extended fronts, based on his common experience with Patton in conducting mobile warfare oriented on the attack, and based on his high level of expertise in gathering information and judging time-distance, Walker was exactly the right leader for the time. His orchestrations of reserves, use of counterattack, effective use of his staff, and decisive leadership in a tenuous time were all characteristics that were developed over a lifetime and refined under a period of Patton’s senior leadership. It was not merely the common experience in World War II that Patton and Walker had shared that shaped Walker, but the role model that Patton provided that form the common tenets of leadership and warfighting that Walker demonstrated at the Pusan Perimeter. They made Walton Walker a unique captain for the place and time of the Pusan Perimeter.

THE LESSON OF PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

What shall we conclude about the relationship of Walton S. Walker and George S. Patton? It is impossible to determine that Walker considered Patton to be a mentor from the available evidence. They evidently did not have that type of relationship. Instead, they were close professional comrades with a mutual respect and admiration born of months of combat together, and a shared philosophy of professional development, leadership and warfighting. As Walker took combat command of the Eighth Army, he had come to a special place of
excellence reserved for America's greatest captains, as had his Army Commander six years earlier. Walker's generalship had been refined by his time with Patton. This paper has demonstrated the commonalities of their leadership faith that reflected in the successful Pusan Perimeter campaign.

It will be more useful to extend the lens of analysis to include a larger set of officers who came into close professional relationships beginning in World War II, through the interwar years, World War II, and into Korea. In this larger context, there were elements of relationship that are worthy of emulation today. In the dissection of campaigns and individual leaders, it may be easy to lose sight of the closeness of the interwar generation of officers. Many of the senior leaders of World War II had spent the interwar years from 1919 to 1941 as field grade officers in a series of less demanding assignments that allowed them plenty of time for association and education.

Walton Walker was a close personal friend of Leonard Gerow, Courtney Hodges, Dwight Eisenhower, and George C. Marshall. Gerow was the best man in his wedding and the Godfather of his son. Walker had served with J. Lawton Collins at West Point, been Eisenhower's friend since 1916, and twice served as Executive Officer to Marshall. Walker emerged from the Second World War as one of the most highly respected corps commanders in combat, a leader among peers, with a high rating from Eisenhower. The importance of George C. Marshall to the developing character of the World War II generation of leaders is common knowledge. Collins' support for Walker may have saved him from relief in the dark days of the Korean War, especially when General Almond was misunderstanding, misrepresenting, and competing with Walker for command attention in Korea. It was Collins as Chief of Staff of the Army who came to Korea in both August and December 1950 when there were calls for Walker's relief and saw for himself that General Walker should have been commended for his command, not relieved. The professional relationship Walker gained serving under Patton lasted until Patton's death, and influenced Walker thereafter, within the limits outlined in this paper. These officers all maintained close personal and professional relationships that contributed to common understanding and mutual assistance in the challenges of career and warfighting.

This willingness to assist and common understanding extended to General Walker's trusted subordinates. He relied on his personal staff, chief of staff, and primary staff as trusted agents and "directed telescopes" throughout the perimeter battle. They helped him to keep abreast of a rapidly changing and confusing situation, and freed Walker to spend time at the front. The same conclusion about relationships applies. Walker could rely on Gene Landrum
as Chief of Staff, on William A. Collier as Deputy Chief of Staff, and Operations Officer Allan MacLean as his "tactical gofers" because Walker had built up a relationship of trust with these officers over years of common service. Walker had strong professional relationships and a common warfighter's mindset with subordinates that influenced his successful operations as well. 85

This paper demonstrated the power of the professional relationship of Walton Walker and George Patton, and suggests that similar relationships existed between Walker and other officers from the interwar generation. The lesson here is that in the midst of an Army that contains a larger set of officers, rotating between assignments, it is critical to continue to foster professional relationships bordering on mentorship and focused on warfighting, because these types of relationships have been demonstrated to influence the outcome of combats in times past. This would also suggest that the tendency to discuss shared experience at the combat training centers is a healthy parallel in our Army to the experiences that Walker and his generation knew at interwar schools, the Louisiana or Tennessee maneuvers, or in combat during World War II. Walton Walker drew on the professional examples and friends that he had cultivated in his successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter in 1950.

WORD COUNT=8503
ENDNOTES


2 Derrick Narsa Raju, *Command and Leadership: General Walton Harris Walker in Korea*. Master of Arts Thesis. Supervisor, Professor Peter Maslowski. Graduate College at the University of Nebraska. (Lincoln, NB: August 1992), 90.


3 Donald W. Booze, Jr., “Old Timer: Eugene M. Landrum and the Pusan Perimeter.”

Unpublished Monograph. 2 Apr 2000, 11.


Colonel (Retired) Layton C. (Joe) Tyner, aide to General Walker in Korea, telephone interview by author, 2 April 2001.


9 Lynch interview. Joe Tyner does not recall such COMINT. He verified that General Walker received a closed, individual daily briefing from an intelligence captain, but maintains that information from COL Allen D. MacLean and daily visits from the front were more useful.

10 Appleman, 308.

11 Examples of Walker’s timely moves include his famous repositioning of the 25th Infantry Division south over 150 miles towards Masan in 36 hours, his use of the Marine Brigade at the Naktong Bulge, and the 27th Infantry Regiment in the Bowling Alley near Taegu. Walker repositioned battalions and regiments like they were chess pieces throughout the battle. His use of road and rail to reposition the 25th Division, and the role of the Eighth Army staff in assisting that move, are reminiscent of Patton’s radical redirection of the Third Army in the Battle of the Bulge. Uzal Ent said in his 25 April 2001 e-mail, “Walker had a keen sense of time and space factors, the enemy situation and his own troop assets. Time and again, he committed just the right reserves at a critical point to save the day.”

Ent, *Fighting on the Brink*, 213.

12 Blair, 389.

13 Ent, *Fighting on the Brink*, 213. Appleman, 149

14 Blair, 34.

15 Lynch undated letter to Tyner.
J.F. Dunford, The Strategic Implications of Defensive Operations at the Pusan Perimeter July-September 1950. Strategy Research Project. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 7 April 1999), 28. Uzal Ent’s book on the Pusan Perimeter, Fighting on the Brink, the recent and only fully detailed explanation of the battles, based on large part on primary sources, is laudatory of Walker’s accomplishment, as is John Toland. (John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953. (New York: William Morrow, 1991). These detailed sources have been published within the last decade, and supersede earlier, less deeply researched sources.


“War in Asia.” Time Magazine. 31 July 1950, 18.

Toland, 129. Patton and Walker both died in untimely vehicle accidents, five years and one day apart.


Lynch interview.

Toland, 130, 132, 224. Tyner interview. Lynch interview.

General (Retired) Sam S. Walker, son of Walton H. Walker, telephone interview with the author, 5 May 2001. Colonel Tyner’s recollection of the specific title of the desk reference has understandably faded with the passing of time. Both Tyner and Lynch do not recall War As I Knew It, but General Sam Walker confirms that General Walton Walker received a review copy of the volume.

Patton, 196.

D’Este, 298.


Ibid, 264.


D’Este, 575-576.


Blumenson, Patton Papers, 651.

Ibid, 616, 680.


46 Kemp, 26-27. Farago, 648.
47 Kemp, 217-218.
48 Patton, 191-192.
49 Ibid, 655.
50 Farago, 757.
51 “War in Asia,” 18.
52 Patton, 247.

56 Kemp, 63, 79, 84, 128.
57 Wallace, 131. Farago, 727-728.
59 Lynch interview.
60 Appleman, 334.
61 Lynch letter to Tyner. Collins, 109, 177. John Toland compared the successful defense at the Naktong Bulge to the Battle of the Bulge and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter to the breakout from Normandy. Toland, 166, 224.

62 Neither COL (Ret) Layton C. Tyner, nor GEN (Ret) Sam Walker recalled any strong and visible mentoring relationship between Patton and Walker. BG (Ret) Edward M. Lynch did see similarities of action and philosophy reflected between the generals, noting the similarity when he read D’Este’s book on Patton, *A Genius for War*. This paper will attempt to further explore what those similarities were. The premise on which such exploration is based is that the combat association between Walker and Patton, senior leader to subordinate, must have had some impact, as such life-changing experiences often do. It has become accepted principal with the author, based on many conversations with combat veterans during his Army career, that there is a special character of relationship between men born of combat, as there is often between human individuals who share a challenge or trial. Additionally, the command climate established by General Patton in the Third Army, and its impact on operations, staff actions and the conduct of battle for subordinates like Walker, had a necessarily formative effect on Walker as a commander himself.

63 Tyner noted that General Walker visited the medical evacuation trains during the Pusan Perimeter defense. Lynch noted that Walker often talked to the surgeons at the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH). Lynch tells a compelling story linking General Patton, Walker, and the wounded. In North Africa, General Patton was aided by the actions of Colonel H. William Wilbur, who earned the Medal of Honor. During the Pusan Perimeter defense, one day after the morning briefing, pilot Lynch was informed that Army Commander Walker was personally aiding the evacuation of a wounded officer. Walker accompanied the wounded and
helped to load him on his own aircraft, which could only hold the stretcher. Lynch flew the wounded officer through a treacherous mountain pass to treatment. This officer was Lieutenant William H. Wilbur, Jr., who died of wounds on 6 September 1950. (U.S. Military Academy Register of Graduates, 2000 edition, pages 4-94 and 4-298). General Walker remembered the importance of the father to Patton and aided the son. Lynch stated that this was the real Walker, a deeply caring and loyal leader.

63 Raju, 52-3.
64 Nye, 21, 77.
65 Ent, Fighting on the Brink, 56.

Raju, 95.
68 Farago, 645.
69 Toland, 130.
70 Raju, 40. Toland, 130.
71 Nye, 90. Ent, 213.
72 Nye, 156. Patton, 399-400. Ent, “With Their Backs to the Wall,” B-6. Appleman, 149.

73 The Walker LOI is discussed and partially quoted in Ent, 57.
74 Appleman, 252.
75 Patton, 416-417. Earlier in the same Appendix, Patton had outlined as a general principle for the defense, “The defense will consist of mutually supporting small groups arranged in depth,” 412.
77 Raju, 95. His son in the telephone interview provided the account of GEN Walton Walker’s study of military history. GEN (Ret) Sam Walker recalled his father’s study, collection of military history books, particularly military biography, and visits to battlefields with children in tow when Sam was growing up.
78 During his interview, GEN (Ret) Sam Walker shared that GEN Douglas MacArthur shared with him on the occasion of his escorting his father’s remains to the United States that MacArthur considered the defense of the Pusan Perimeter to be the greatest American campaign since Stonewall Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862. Further, GEN MacArthur twice recommended Walker for promotion to General, and recommended GEN Walton Walker for the Medal of Honor for his courageous leadership under fire during the defense of Korea, but this was downgraded to a Distinguished Service Medal.
80 Raju, 27. Collins, 89. Blair, 34.
81 Ibid, 28.
83 GEN (Ret) Sam Walker shared that GEN Walton Walker received letters from GEN Patton after the end of the war in Europe stating that Patton wanted Walker to command a Corps for him if Third Army was needed for the invasion of Japan.
84 Appleman, 109. Toland, 130. Boone, “Old Timer,” 11, 14. Blair, 389. It is interesting to compare the strength of relationships and length of experience on general staffs today with that of the interwar generation through World War II and Korea. In that small army, officers were known by reputation if not personally, the officer corps was so small. They also didn’t move as much. Today, with two-year rotations and wholesale changes of staff personnel each summer, learning and transition occupy most of the summer-to-summer work year. Even with the common experience of a Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercise, the staff
usually dissolves within months of the learning experience. Though our systems of professional education and training have continually improved, the pace and rotation of staff experience would make it a challenge for staffs of today to equal the common mindset and refined methodology of those who emerged from months of combat together in World War II.